Millions of credit-constrained borrowers turn to title loans every
Millions of credit-constrained borrowers turn to title loans every year to meet their liquidity needs. Legislatures and regulators have debated how to best regulate these transactions, but surprisingly, we still know very little about the customers who use title loans. This Article reports findings from the first large-scale academic study of title lending customers. We surveyed over 450 title lending customers across three states and obtained information about customers' demographic and behavioral characteristics. Based on the results of our survey, and guided by insights from behavioral economics, this Article seeks to reframe the title lending debate. Instead of focusing on the risks and consequences of borrowers' cars being repossessed, as the vast bulk of the literature does, we argue that the primary problem that most borrowers face is underestimating the true cost of taking out a title loan. Borrowers' survey responses demonstrate that many borrowers are overly optimistic and experience self-control problems that affect their ability to make timely loan payments. We argue that these deviations from the assumptions of classical economics do not warrant an outright ban of title lending, but they do provide room for policy interventions. Policymakers can improve efficiency in title lending markets by requiring
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2014 lenders to disclose to consumers the likely experiences they will have with their title loans rather than merely requiring lenders to communicate pricing information. I. INTRODUCTION Millions of people who are outside the mainstream banking system turn to title loans each year as a means of accessing credit. 1 Every year around 7500 title lenders make more than $1.5 billion in loans across the country. 2 In Texas alone in 2012, borrowers took out almost $500 million in title loans. 3 Title loans are high-cost, short-term, small-dollar loans secured by a vehicle that the borrower usually owns outright. The most common term for the loan is one month, the interest rate charged is commonly around 300% (when expressed as an annual percentage rate), and the lender has the right to repossess the borrower's vehicle if the borrower defaults on the loan. 4 The fact that these loans typically have high interest rates and threaten to deprive borrowers of their means of transportation has generated significant concern about the loans' welfare effects at both the state 5 and federal level. 6 Law on title lending differs greatly throughout the country, with some states banning the industry entirely and others allowing it to operate with virtually no oversight. It is also in flux. For instance, in 2008, New Hampshire effectively shut the doors of all of its title lenders by imposing a thirty-six percent interest rate cap, but then repealed the cap and welcomed lenders back only four years later. 8 Even local governments in cities across the country, like Chicago, are currently considering regulations to restrict title lending. 9 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the federal agency in charge of consumer credit regulation, has the power to pass rules for title lenders 1° and has shown interest in fringe banking companies, 11 but is still in the midst of considering what actions to take.
This regulatory uncertainty entreats a critical analysis of how lenders and customers act in title lending markets. A general examination of consumer credit markets is insufficient because it misses the unique concerns generated by title lending. Moreover, a theoretical analysis of how classical economic principles would operate in the title lending market is inadequate because customers frequently deviate from the assumptions made in these models. 12 As Oren Bar-Gill has noted, "Regulation should 4 . See generally Hawkins, Credit on Wheels, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Gov Vetoes Bill to Raise Title Loan Interest in NH,
YAHOO! NEWS (July 6, 2011, 4:28 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/gov-vetoes-bill-raise-title-loan-interest-nh-202828930.html (discussing the New Hampshire Governor's decision to veto a bill permitting title lending because of the risk title lending poses to borrowers' continued employment).
6. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H5181-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Mascara) (arguing that title lending customers "depend on their automobiles and trucks for transportation to their jobs, vital medical appointments, and school for their children" and concluding that "the loss of a vehicle through an unfair foreclosure often results in the loss of a job or other serious consequences"). 11. See Press Release, City of Chicago, supra note 9 (describing a partnership between the Bureau and the city of Chicago aimed at stopping title lending abuses).
Garry Rayno, Lynch Vetoes Bill that Would Allow Interest Rates to
12. See infra text accompanying notes 138-90 (outlining several ways people behave in opposition to the predictions of classical economics).
only be considered where such specific evidence proves the existence, in the specific market, of a behavioral market failure that generates significant welfare costs .... [A]ny legal intervention must be based on a detailed, market-specific inquiry." 13 Although other fringe banking issues have received significant critical attention in the legal literature, 14 most of the important empirical questions about title lending remain unanswered, especially questions surrounding the characteristics and behavior of people who use title loans. 5 To craft optimal title lending regulation, however, policymakers need to understand who uses title loans and why, what risks people face in using them, and whether people using title loan products conform to the assumptions of the rational actor model used in traditional economics (and by many policymakers). In other alternative financial services markets, significant information about these issues already exists. The Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances asks subjects about payday loan use,16 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households asks about alternative financial services other than title loans.
Similarly, Michael Barr gathered detailed information about the demographic characteristics of consumers using a wide variety of short-term credit other than title loans. 8 But, none of the existing scholarship answers these critical questions for title lending markets.
This Article is the first large-scale empirical investigation of the customers who use title loans. Based on a survey of over 450 customers, in three states, we find that the typical title lending customer has a moderate level of education, is middle-aged, is white, and is a woman. Using survey evidence, we make the case that in general, customers suffer from behavioral biases that impede perfectly rational use of the title loan product. Namely, they are overly optimistic, have limited self-control, and display limited attention. Yet, the results are not overwhelming, and the responses in our surveys discredit the idea in some prior work that title lending customers are a vulnerable, irrational population. This Article aims to reframe the debate over title lending. Instead of merely focusing on the risk and consequences of repossession, we argue that the primary risk the vast majority of consumers face using title loans is that they will underestimate the true cost of the loan. Consumers, we contend, make systematic mistakes as they consider the loan and weigh its perceived costs and benefits. Repossession affects few borrowers, and our evidence indicates that most borrowers will not lose their only way to work because of repossession. Thus, prohibitions on title loans based on the premise that borrowers are frequently losing their vehicles are misguided. The optimal regulatory response, we argue, is requiring disclosures that inform customers of the true cost of title lending, including the likely ways in which the borrower will use the loan and not merely the pricing of the loan.
We begin in Part II by explaining the methodology of our survey and describing the regulatory reports that we obtained for this paper. We partnered with a large title lending company to administer surveys, informed by previous behavioral economics literature, to all customers, who came into ten different stores in three different states (Idaho, Georgia, and Texas), to take out a title loan or make a payment on an existing title loan. The survey asked about the borrowers' demographics, loan usage patterns, and time and risk preferences. We also obtained reports from the Idaho and Texas state regulatory agencies to determine the proportion of cars being used as collateral that are repossessed.
Part III describes the law that currently governs title lending at the federal level and locally in the three jurisdictions in which we surveyed customers. This Part explains the legal backdrop against which title loan companies operate. It serves as a general introduction to title lending law and offers a starting point as we discuss our policy recommendations.
Part IV discusses the demographics of the customers in our survey. We find that the typical title lending customer is an older, white woman who is moderately well educated. It also considers the demographic makeup of customers surveyed in previous studies of fringe banking customers for comparison, and we also compare title lending customers to the general populations in Georgia, Idaho, and Texas.
In Part V, we review the behavioral economics literature relevant to credit markets serving low-income households. We discuss the theoretical underpinnings and review the empirical and experimental support for a number of behavioral anomalies. We find that title customers are moderately overly optimistic about the time it will take them to pay off their loans and mispredict their ability to save to pay off the loan in the near future.
Finally, we conclude in Part VI by discussing our study's implications for title lending policy. We suggest that policymakers should use behaviorally informed disclosures to maximize efficient use of title loans. By disclosing pattern-of-use information along with pricing early enough in the transaction to affect consumer decision making, the law can aid in No. 4] combating the biases customers experience when considering title loans. Finally, we argue that states that have prohibited title lending have done so without sufficient empirical warrant; the risk of customers losing their jobs due to repossession has been vastly overstated and title lending customers are not the irrational, vulnerable population that previous scholarship has envisioned.
II. METHODOLOGY
To learn more about title lending customers, we surveyed over 450 borrowers across ten locations (title lending firm storefronts). To administer the survey, we partnered with a large title lending firm that operates in numerous states. By doing so, we were able to reach a much larger sample of customers than other research has been capable of reaching. For example, one of us (Jim Hawkins) previously attempted to survey title lending customers by positioning research assistants outside title lending locations and asking people to participate as they left the store. 19 Using this method, he was only able to survey thirty-five customers after 100 person-hours of work. By partnering with the lender we were able to survey a much larger sample, 453 customers. 2 0 Our approach follows previous studies in other consumer credit markets that have successfully partnered with firms to reach a larger sample. 21 We created the survey instrument using standard demographic and behavioral economic questions, as well as questions about the borrowers' expectations for the loans and their usage patterns. The behavioral questions are used to determine how much risk borrowers are willing to accept and how much they care about the future. We developed the questions for our survey by reviewing the literature on title lending specifically and behavioral economics more generally, by using the prior experience Hawkins had surveying title lending customers with a similar instrument, and by the company pre-testing an earlier draft of the survey instrument with a small group of customers. 22 We included four questions on the survey that the company specifically wanted answered. The questions the company wanted included were #11, 12, 13, and 19. Other than reviewing our research to ensure the company remained anonymous, the company did not have any say in our results. The survey is presented in Appendix A.
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The surveys were completed in November and December 2012. The company chose ten representative stores in three different states: Idaho, Georgia, and Texas. The states have three distinct approaches to regulating title loans, although there are similarities that allow us to meaningfully compare consumers across all states. All three states allow very high interest rates on title loans and have some form of disclosure requirement. 23 We mailed fifty surveys to each title lending location (three in Texas and Georgia and four in Idaho), along with directions on how to administer the survey and forms for record keeping. Each title lender employee was instructed to offer the survey to all customers who took out or made a payment on a loan as long as they had not already completed a survey. The borrowers put their surveys in envelopes and sealed them so that they could be sure that their answers were confidential. All customers who completed the survey were given an informed consent form, and the University of Houston Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects approved the study. 24 In return for completing the survey, each borrower received a $10 Target or Wal-Mart gift card. To ensure that no one completed more than one survey, the borrower's name was checked against the list of individuals who had already received a gift card. The employee recorded daily the number of completed surveys and the number of individuals who turned down the survey. The response rate was high at 78.8%.25 Broken down by state, surveys were completed by 200 borrowers at four stores in Idaho, 149 borrowers at three stores in Texas, and 104 borrowers at three stores in Georgia.
By partnering with the title lending company, we were also able to offer the survey to all customers, making selection errors less likely at the customer level, though they may still be present at the store level. Thus while the stores were not randomly selected, the survey was offered to the entire population of borrowers at those stores during the study period.
Although we have a larger sample size than many other studies, there are still some limitations to our research design. First, the survey data is all self-reported, and we do not attempt to verify the answers. 23 . See infra Part III. The different regulatory approaches are specifically discussed, along with the implications of these differences.
24. The protocol number is 13070-EX. 25. From our completion reports from eight of the ten stores, 396 customers completed the survey, and 104 declined to take the survey. The two stores that did not provide completion reports also had fewer completed surveys, so it is likely the response rate would be lower if data from those stores were available. Since together they represent only twenty percent of the planned surveys, this effect would not be too severe.
This approach, however, is frequently used in the literature on consumer credit products. 26 Second, we only surveyed borrowers at ten locations of one company so our sample is not nationally representative. In one sense, this is beneficial; because the relevant laws in our states are similar enough that we can aggregate the borrowers across stores. On the other hand, this means that we cannot directly generalize our results to the national level. Most other studies of title lending have the same limitation, and we do not have reason to believe that our ten stores are significantly different from other stores operated by this lender.
What may be a larger limitation is the fact that we have only partnered with one company. If borrowers who choose our title lending company are significantly different from those that choose other title lenders, this will create selection bias in our results. 27 Most other studies in this area are also conducted with just one partner company, however, so this limitation is not unique to our paper. In addition to the survey data, we also gathered data on the title lending industry from the state regulatory agencies in Texas and Idaho. 29 Importantly, this data includes the repossession rates in these two states. The data provides additional insight into the consequences of title lending. Georgia does not regulate title loans at the state level through a statewide licensing requirement, 30 so data about repossession rates in Georgia does not currently exist. We present this data with the caveat that it is originally self-reported by the lenders and not subject to review by the state agencies.
The reports from state regulators show that less than 10% of cars are repossessed in the two states at hand. In Idaho in 2011,31 customers took out 27,510 new title loans. 27. For example, the company with which we partnered does not require a pay stub in Georgia, but at least one local competitor does require a pay stub to make a loan -meaning that customers who cannot provide a pay stub may be disproportionately represented in our company's customer base.
28 Title loans in all of the states we studied are governed by the federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). Among other requirements, TILA obligates lenders to disclose the total finance charges for title loans and to present the cost of loans as an annual percentage rate ("APR"). 4 In some places, title lending companies must comply with city ordinances, as well as state and federal law. 46 In Texas, for instance, Austin, Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio have passed ordinances that regulate how title lending companies offer loans, and other Texas cities are considering similar measures. 4 1 Yet, none of the cities in which our survey was administered had ordinances that substantially affect the title loan transaction itself. 4 The three jurisdictions involved in our survey represent three distinct approaches to title lending regulation. Idaho has a statute specifically designed for title loans; Georgia uses its pawnbroker law to regulate title lending; and Texas, while it has historically allowed lenders to operate under its Credit Service Organization law with minimal oversight, recently enacted some provisions aimed directly at title loan companies. Despite some similarities between specific laws in these different frameworks, such as the requirement that title loan companies obtain licenses with the state or municipal governments, 49 these states have adopted somewhat different approaches to regulating title lending transactions.
A. Idaho
In Idaho, the general provisions in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") that deals with secured loans apply to title loans, 50 except to the extent that an Idaho statute specifically aimed at title loans displaces those general provisions. 51 Thus, like all secured creditors, title lenders in Idaho must meet three specific formalities in order for their security interest to attach to the vehicle. 5 2 First, there must be value given by both parties. 53 Second, the debtor must have rights in the collateral. 5 4 And finally, there needs to be an authenticated security agreement. 55 In addition to the Article 9 provisions, Idaho's statute 48. Most of the cities involved in our study have no specific ordinances, and the city ordinances that do apply to our subject stores primarily involve permits and record keeping. mandates that title lenders include the following information in their title loan agreement: make, model, and year of the titled personal property; VIN and license plate number; name, address and date of birth of the debtor; date the agreement is executed; and the maturity date of the title loan agreement. 6 Under Article 9, the secured creditor must perfect that interest to obtain priority over other creditors and purchasers, 5 and maintain perfection throughout various potential changes in the collateral, the jurisdiction in which the collateral is held, and the name of the debtor. 8 Article 9 leaves the definition of a "default" on the loan for the parties to stipulate in their individual security agreements. 9 Once a default has occurred, the secured party has a number of rights concerning the collateral. Most importantly, the secured party has the right to take possession after default, so long as there is no "breach of the peace." 60 The secured party may also initiate a so-called "Article 9 sale" so long as the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. 61 The debtor must receive notice from the secured party of such disposition of collateral. 62 The secured party may also accept and keep the collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the outstanding debt. 63 Finally, the debtor may redeem his interest and receive his property back from the secured party if he pays off all of the debt owing.' 4 If the secured party does not comply with the U.C.C. in dealings with the debtor, the debtor may be entitled to certain damages. 65 In addition to the Article 9 provisions, Idaho's statute mandates that title lenders include the following disclosure in each loan agreement:
(1) This loan is not intended to meet long-term financial needs.
(2) You should use this loan only to meet short-term cash needs. (3) You will be required to pay additional interest and fees if you renew this loan rather than pay the debt in full when due. you by returning the money you borrowed by the next business day after the date of your loan. (8) If you believe that the title lender has violated the provisions of the Idaho Title Loan Act, you have the right to file a written complaint with the Idaho Department of Finance and the Department will investigate your complaint. Along with these disclosure rules, the state requires that title loans be thirty days in length, but it allows them to be renewed automatically. It does not impose a limit on the amount of interest the title lender charges for the loan, but it does limit the amount of the loan relative to the value of the vehicle. 8 There are no limits on the number of times a loan can be rolled over (renewed), but the statute requires that on the third renewal of a loan, the debtor must make an additional principal payment and pay the interest due on the loan. The statute states: "the debtor shall be required to make a payment of at least ten percent (10%) of the principal amount of the original title loan in addition to any finance charges that are due. If the debtor defaults on the loan, there are two important rules governing the situation, beyond the general rules in Article 9. First, the lender is required to mail a letter to the debtor informing the debtor that "the debtor has ten (10) days from the date of the notice in which to cure the default." ' Second, the statute specifically prohibits lenders from collecting any deficiency from the debtor personally unless the debtor prevents repossession, damages the vehicle, or commits fraud; the lender's only recourse is to repossess the vehicle.1
B. Georgia
Georgia regulates title loans as pawn loans, specifically including title lending in its definition of "pledged goods," which the statute defines as "tangible personal property, including, without limitation, all types of motor vehicles or any motor vehicle certificate of title, which property is purchased by, deposited with, or otherwise actually delivered into the possession of a pawnbroker in connection with a pawn transaction." 7 2 In addition to the general rules governing pawnbrokers, Georgia's statute has several rules that apply specifically to title lending.
Georgia has a disclosure requirement with simpler language than the Idaho statute (in addition to other disclosure rules similar to those 66. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-504(2)(c) (West 2014). 67. Id. § 28-46-506(1). 68. Id. § 28-46-508(3) (prohibiting loans "in which the amount of money loaned, when combined with the outstanding balance of other outstanding title loan agreements the debtor has with the same lender secured by any single titled personal property, exceeds the retail value of the titled personal property as determined by common motor vehicle appraisal guides").
69. [Vol. 2014 required by federal law)." Lenders must include the statement: "Failure to make your payment as described in this document can result in the loss of your motor vehicle. The pawnbroker can also charge you certain fees if he or she actually repossesses the motor vehicle." ' 4 Like Idaho, Georgia mandates that title loans be for thirty days," but unlike Idaho, Georgia's law does not govern rollovers in any way, and it puts caps on the fees that lenders may charge, although the caps are high.6
If the borrower defaults, the statute empowers the lender to repossess the vehicle," but it sets limits on the fees lenders can charge in connection with the repossession.8 Like Idaho, Georgia prohibits agreements that make the borrower personally liable for the debt."
C. Texas
Title loan companies in Texas operate under a unique arrangement in which the title loan company does not generally directly lend the customers any money. Instead, they act as Credit Service Organizations ("CSOs"), which are organizations that, under the Texas Finance Code, either improve consumers' credit histories or obtain extensions of consumer credit on behalf of consumers.
0 As a CSO, the title loan company brokers a loan between the consumer and a third-party lender. The title loan company guarantees the loan for the lender and charges a fee to the customer. 81 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has affirmed that this statute permits payday lenders to operate in this manner, 82 and until recently, title loan companies operating as CSOs were 77. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(3). 78. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(4)(C) ("In addition to the charges provided for in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, in a pawn transaction or in any extension or continuation of a pawn transaction involving a motor vehicle or a motor vehicle certificate of title, a pawnbroker may charge the following... (ii) No more than $5.00 per day in storage fees, but only if an actual repossession pursuant to a default takes place on a vehicle which was not already in the pawnbroker's possession and only for each day the pawnbroker must actually retain possession of the motor vehicle; and (iii) A repossession fee of $50.00 within 50 miles of the office where the pawn originated, $100.00 within 51 to 100 miles, $150.00 within 101 to 300 miles and a fee of $250.00 beyond 300 miles, but only if an actual repossession pursuant to a default takes place on a vehicle which was not already in the pawnbroker's possession.").
79. ("Our services include arranging loans with independent third-party lenders, assisting in the preparation of loan applications and loan documents, and accepting loan payments for the lenders. We do not make, fund or participate in the loans made by the lenders, but we assist customers in obtaining credit and enhance their creditworthiness by issuing a letter of credit to guarantee the customer's payment obligations to the independent third-party lender.").
82. Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004).
No. 4] under little direct regulation. As in Idaho, title loan companies in Texas had to comply with Article 9's provisions and TILA, but otherwise they had substantial leeway in conducting their business. In 2011, the Texas legislature passed a law that required CSOs acting as "credit access businesses" to follow certain guidelines starting in January 2012.83 The most significant provisions relate to disclosures title lending companies must make. First, in a conspicuous place at each lending location, title lending companies must post a notice that says:
An advance of money obtained through a payday loan or auto title loan is not intended to meet long-term financial needs. A payday loan or auto title loan should only be used to meet immediate shortterm cash needs. Refinancing the loan rather than paying the debt in full when due will require the payment of additional charges.
8 4
In addition to this posted disclosure, the statute lays out several other remarkable disclosures that lenders must make, 85 including the following information:
(1) the interest, fees, and annual percentage rates, as applicable, to be charged on a deferred presentment transaction or on a motor vehicle title loan, as applicable, in comparison to interest, fees, and annual percentage rates to be charged on other alternative forms of consumer debt; (2) the amount of accumulated fees a consumer would incur by renewing or refinancing a deferred presentment transaction or motor vehicle title loan that remains outstanding for a period of two weeks, one month, two months, and three months; and (3) information regarding the typical pattern of repayment of deferred presentment transactions and motor vehicle title loans.
6
With regard to title lending in particular, the company must warn customers that "the consumer may be required to surrender possession of the motor vehicle to the lender or other person to satisfy the consumer's outstanding obligations under the loan." 8 Finally, the new Texas law also imposes reporting requirements on title loan companies. 88 Beyond these disclosure laws, Texas continues to have little direct title lending regulation. It imposes no limit on the charges companies can assess,89 no requirements for how long loans must last, no limits on the number of times a borrower rolls over a loan, and no limit on the loan amount. The rules in Article 9 concerning when a borrower defaults on a loan apply to title loans in Texas. Unlike the laws in Idaho and Georgia which alter the U.C.C.'s rule, Article 9 allows title loan companies to sue 83 borrowers for any amount remaining due on the loan after the collateral is sold. 9 "
All of these laws, at both the state and federal level, have been passed without any information about the demographics of title lending customers or their behavioral tendencies. Parts IV and V take up these questions in hope of better informing these legislative decisions.
IV. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF CUSTOMERS IN TITLE LENDING MARKETS
Understanding who uses title loans is important in assessing whether regulation of title lending is advisable and what types of regulation would be optimal. In other fringe credit markets, we have extensive data on the demographics of customers. The Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances, for instance, asked households about payday loan use for the first time in 2007, generating a nationally representative sample of borrower information. 91 Similarly, the FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households asks whether households have used many other alternative financial services, but does not address title loans in their questions. 92 Thus, in the title lending context, no similar resources for demographic data exist.
Prior work focusing on the demographics of title lending customers has been limited both in its approach to the issue and the factors it considered. Nathalie Martin and Ernesto Longa summarize prior work on the demographics of title lending customers in a recent article. 93 The two main studies they discuss are one by Nathalie Martin and Ozymandias Adams from 2012 that found, using data from regulators in New Mexico, that "the average title loan borrower in New Mexico makes between $ 20,116 and $ 27,719,"' 9 and one by the state of Illinois which concluded that in 1999-2000, "title loan customers in Illinois earn an average of $ 19,808." 9 ' But, beyond information about customers' income in two states, these studies do not offer a rich picture of who title lending customers are.
Martin and Longa also discuss geographical studies that find that title lenders are more likely to open stores in "low-income neighborhoods with moderate poverty, where a large percentage of the residents are members of racial/ethnic minority groups, young or elderly, or recent ploma." 9 The data from these studies, however, are not about title lending exclusively but include payday lenders, check cashing stores, and other lenders, making it difficult to know which findings are relevant to title lending stores in particular. 9 In addition, Todd Zywicki has published a series of articles based primarily on interviews with title lenders. 98 Zywicki argues that title lending customers fall into three groups: moderate income customers with impaired credit histories, lower income customers, and small business owners. 99 Our work differs fundamentally from Zywicki's because our empirical strategy involves gaining information directly from customers and not from lenders' perceptions of customers. We also obtain a wider variety of information about customers than Zywicki.
Our survey offers the first detailed look at the demographics of title lending customers, supplementing the information reported in prior work and, for the first time, addressing more directly some of the key demographic categories, such as education level, gender, and race. Summary statistics for several of the measures are presented in Table 1 . We also provide data on the population of the states in which we surveyed customers, where applicable, so that we can compare the proportion of each subpopulation of title lending customers to the same subpopulation in the general population in the state. 00 96 99. Zywicki, Consumer Use, supra note 98, at 426. 100. We obtained data about the population of each state from the U.S. Census Bureau. American Fact Finder, Georgia UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/ nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (insert "Georgia" into the "Community Facts" search box, and select "Go") (last visited Mar. 25, 2013); American Fact Finder, Idaho, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://fact finder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (insert "Idaho" into the "Community Facts" search box, and select "Go") (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); American Fact Finder, Texas, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (insert "Texas" into the "Community Facts" search box, and select "Go") (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
A. Sex
As Table 1 indicates, we find that 41.56% of borrowers surveyed are male, meaning that women are slightly more likely than men to use auto title loans. This finding is similar to the demographics for other alternative financial services. Women are also more likely to use payday loans, 1 1 pawnshops, 1 0 2 and rent-to-own services. 1 03
A variety of explanations have been offered for why women are more likely than men to use alternative financial service providers. First, men may be less likely to admit that they are experiencing financial need, leaving their wife or partner to seek financing.
1 0 4 Second, women may seek loans from title lenders because they bear more financial responsibility for children, and they are more likely to declare bankruptcy than men. 1 5 But, because our survey captured responses from people both originating loans and making payments on loans, it could be simply that more women were making the payments on loans that were cosigned with a man. 
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B. Race
Rows 3 through 7 in Table 1 present our racial statistics. The majority of borrowers are white, at 57.78%. The next most highly represented group is African-Americans at 17.78%, followed by Hispanics at 15.56%. 7.56% of borrowers identified as "Other," while less than one percent of borrowers were Asian (.67%) or two or more races (.67%). There are also large differences between states. Columns 3-8 of Table 1 
Comparing our survey results to the overall state populations shows that some minority groups are overrepresented among title lending customers as compared to the general population. In Georgia, only 31% of the state population is black, while nearly 36% of the borrowers in our survey classified themselves as black. In Texas, almost 30% of our borrowers are black, while only 12% of the state population is black. On the other hand, only 20% of borrowers in Texas are Hispanic, compared with 38% of the population. And in each survey state, Asians are underrepresented in our borrowers. We did not ask any questions about income, so we cannot control for any income effects. It is possible that if we controlled for the borrowers' income, the rate of use would not be different in a statistically significant way.
We can also compare the number of minorities using title loans to numbers of the same subpopulation using other alternative financial service (AFS) providers. Table 2 html (finding that blacks and Hispanics do use payday loans more often than whites but concluding that "once we control for financial characteristics -such as past delinquency, debt-toincome ratios, and credit availability, blacks and Hispanics are not significantly more likely than whites to use payday credit").
to-own stores, as well as people who have used any alternative financial services in the past month (not including title loans). As Table 2 indicates, we found there were fewer black and Hispanic individuals among title loan customers compared to users of other fringe credit products. Given the large Caucasian population in Idaho, however, these results might not be generalizable. In addition, black and Hispanic individuals own cars at lower rates than white individuals, 0 9 which may explain the difference as compared to other fringe credit products.
C Age
The median age of the title lending borrowers in our survey was 40 years old. In other fringe lending contexts, borrowers are much more likely to be younger. For instance, the FTC found that 51% of rent-toown customers were between 18 and 34 years old. 1 10 Similarly, 52.49% of pawnshop customers in Florida and 38.15% of those in Texas were between 18 and 34, with 82.81% in Florida and 71.32% in Texas being younger than 45.1 Younger people may be more likely to seek credit from alternative financial service providers because they do not have the established credit and income histories to qualify for mainstream credit, so it is remarkable that title lending customers are older. 112 The most 108. Rent-to-own data from FTC SURVEY, supra note 103, at 41 likely explanation for this observation is that, unlike in other fringe credit transactions, title lending customers must typically own a vehicle outright to take out a title loan.
D. Occupation
We also asked about the borrowers' occupations. The results of this question are presented in Tables 3 and 4 . The first table summarizes the answers we received based on the options we presented, whereas the second classifies the occupations according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Major Occupation Group classification system. 113 We present the second table because almost 30% of borrowers chose "Other" as their occupation. Of those borrowers, however, 84.5% wrote in their occupation. Once we classify our borrowers according the BLS Major Occupation Groups, we are able to describe the employment of 86% of our borrowers. Our results in Table 3 based on the category chosen by the borrowers shows that 15.89% of our sample was self-employed, compared with 6.2% of the general population in the 2011 Census that identified as "self-employed in own not incorporated business."
1 5 This finding is significant because past commentary on the industry has argued that title loans could serve as an important (and perhaps the only) source of credit for some self-employed people. 116 Any regulatory intervention into title lending markets should weigh the costs of denying access to credit to these individuals. One cost of prohibiting title loans, for instance, is that these small businesses may be unable to obtain credit elsewhere. Interestingly, we find that 13.02% of our borrowers did not have a job at the time they took the survey. This includes people who identified as housewives or stay-at-home mothers (16 borrowers), as retired or on disability (33), as students (4), and as unemployed (3). For the portion of the jobless borrowers with no income stream, i.e., without family members or entitlement programs supporting them, this finding appears to confirm industry critics' fears that title lending companies do not evaluate the borrower's ability to repay the debt before making loans. 1 1 7 One caveat of the finding, however, is that only 24 of the unemployed borrowers were originating a loan the day they were surveyed; the other 35 customers could have been visiting the store to make a payment on a loan for another employed customer. While this may seem low since it implies that almost half of our sample has at most a high school diploma, it is actually very close to the national average for educational attainment.
E. Educational Attainment
118 Thus, our findings are contrary to the suggestion of Martin and Longa that title lending targets people with low education. Also, in comparison to users of other fringe banking products, title lending customers are relatively well educated. 73% of rent-to-own customers had no more than a high school diploma in the FTC's survey, 120 and over 15% of customers who used any alternative financial service had less than a high school diploma in the FDIC Survey. 
F. Use of Other Financial Service Products
We asked customers to identify other financial products they use. The answers to this question can inform several significant policy debates. First, one concern that commentators favoring regulatory intervention express about users of fringe credit is whether they have access to mainstream financial products and services. 2 Our survey can help us understand the extent to which title lending customers are outside of the mainstream banking system. Second, commentary that is critical of prohibiting fringe credit products argues that borrowers who cannot use one type of alternative financial service will simply substitute another prod- Tables, UNITED  STATES CENSUS BUREAU Table X [ Vol. 2014 uct that is less efficient. 123 Our study can shed light on the extent to which title lending borrowers already actively participate in other credit transactions.
We asked borrowers what other financial services they used at least once in the past year. The results are summarized in Table 6 .'24 Over 40% of our borrowers have not used a checking account in the past year, suggesting that they are unbanked . Less than 20% have used a credit card in the past year. The title loan customers we surveyed were more likely to be unbanked than other fringe credit users. Rent-to-own customers reported having credit cards (48.4%) and checking accounts (67.5 %) at higher rates than the title loan customers. 126 Similarly, payday loan customers must write a postdated check in order to obtain a loan, so they need to have a checking account. 127 Given the general belief that people outside of the mainstream banking system are more vulnerable, 128. See generally Barr, supra note 122 (analyzing how low-income communities are affected by market imperfections including having less access to alternative forms of credit).
G. Use of the Loan Proceeds
In our survey, we also asked customers "Why did you take out this title loan?" This allows us to determine whether consumers are using title loans to meet unexpected financial or consumption shocks or are using them for normal, expected expenses. If consumers use the loans for unexpected shocks, then title loans perform the important function of smoothing consumption for people who may not have access to traditional consumer lending institutions. 129 If, on the other hand, consumers are using the loans to cover normal, anticipated expenses, this may show either a lack of self-control or uncontrolled financial distress. 130 We also explicitly asked whether the loan is for business expenses. Since automobiles are often one of a person's largest assets, title loans may provide important financing for self-employed borrowers, as we point out above."' Prohibiting title loans would shut down what may be one of the only sources of business credit available for individuals without established borrowing histories with banks. We present the survey results on this question in Table 7 . Our results show that only a small proportion of borrowers were using the loan for business expenses. Only 6% of the borrowers listed "business expenses" as a reason for taking out the loan. Our survey cannot address the question of whether this is the only source of business credit available for these borrowers, but it seems like business credit is not a significant portion of the loans. 129 . In economic terms, consumption smoothing means spreading the effects of any negative shocks over a long period of time rather than over a short period of time. The desire to smooth consumption is an important assumption of all standard economic models of consumer behavior. It is also supported by empirical evidence. Just under a quarter of borrowers used the loan for medical expenses or car repairs, which we believe are most likely to be "emergency" expenses. 132 In these cases, title loans can serve an important economic purpose of allowing people to spread out the effects of unexpected expenses over a longer period of time. Other reasons, like rent or mortgage payments and education expenses, are more likely to be normal rather than emergency expenses. Twenty-three percent of borrowers selected these reasons. For these borrowers, it is harder to argue that the loans serve this consumption smoothing purpose. "Gifts" was quite large, at almost 14%, but we believe this result is because of the timing of our survey. The surveys were administered in late November and December, so we believe that this number would be lower at another time of the year.
Unfortunately, a significant number of borrowers selected "Other" and did not write down the reason why they took out the loan. For these borrowers, we cannot evaluate their reasons for taking out the loan.
H. Borrowers' Means of Getting to Work
Many opponents of title lending argue that borrowers who are unable to repay the loan will lose their vehicles, and, because of that loss, are at a higher risk of losing their jobs. 133 For borrowers to lose their jobs as a result of taking out a title loan, two things must occur. First, customers must lose their vehicles through repossession. Our results show that this does not occur frequently. The regulatory data for Idaho and Texas place the repossession rates per new loan (not per rollover) in both states under ten percent.
1 4 Second, after losing the vehicle, borrowers must have no other way to get to work. To address this second condition, question 3 of our survey asks, "If you lost the vehicle that you used to get your loan, how would you get to work?" If most consumers would not have another way to get to work, this would confirm fears that the loss of the vehicle has dire consequences for borrowers' employment. On the other hand, if most borrowers do have another way of getting to work, it may not cause any disruption in employment.
132. Other expenses, like utilities, could also be emergency expenses, if, for example, the utility bill was unexpectedly high one month, but we cannot distinguish between unexpectedly large bills and normal, expected bills with our question.
133. This argument is ubiquitous in the literature discussing title lending and in policy statements about title lending. Our results show that, in fact, most workers would have another way to get to work. Table 8 presents these results.
1 3 5 Over 40% of borrowers reported that they would use another car that they or their family owns. Interestingly, 4.88% stated that they would buy another car if they lost the one used to collateralize the loan. 136 Less than 15% of borrowers stated that they would have no other way to get to work. While not insignificant, this small percentage suggests that the dire consequences that critics predict are unlikely to occur for the vast majority of title borrowers. Rough calculations would place the percentage of title borrowers who lose their jobs as a result of title lending at 1.5%.13 7 With this demographic information, we have a fuller understanding of who title lending customers are. But, merely knowing their characteristics is insufficient as we consider how to best regulate the industry. We next turn to what our survey tells us about how these customers behave.
V. THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF TITLE LENDING
"Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it with more realistic psychological foundation .... Often these departures are not radical at all because they relax simplifying assumptions that are not central to the economic approach." ' 138 As Camerer and Lowenstein succinctly note, the field of behavioral economics consists, for the most part, of relatively minor deviations from a very 135. Because customers were instructed to select all that apply, the percentages sum to more than
100%.
136. We did not ask any questions about income or wealth, so these customers may not actually be capable of purchasing another vehicle.
137. This would assume that having one's car repossessed and losing one's job if one's car is repossessed are independent. In that case, if 10% of customers have their cars repossessed, and 15% of those customers have no other way to work, then only 1.5% of customers would lose their jobs because of title lending. This is likely not the case, since a borrower whose car is repossessed probably has lower wealth and income than a borrower whose car is not repossessed, and is therefore probably more likely to lack another way of getting to work. The percentage is therefore probably somewhere between our 1.5% figure and the repossession rate in the state. strict traditional notion of decision making. Though these changes are often small, such relaxations of the assumption constraining traditional economic thought can vastly improve upon economists' understanding of decision making in a number of contexts. As we argue below, behavioral economics helps us better understand consumers in the title lending market, and more importantly, can help frame policy solutions to what is a new, rapidly changing market.
Microeconomics has a workhorse model (which Camerer and Loewenstein allude to) that economists use to understand and predict behavior of consumers and other decision makers. This assumes people act rationally and do not make mistakes when it is at all costly to do so. 13 9 Like any theoretical model of human behavior, this rational-actor model is a caricature of real decision making and often grossly simplifies actual behavior. 14 0 That being said, this and other models provide useful insights into decision making in a number of contexts, and the rational actor model has come to define modern microeconomics. In this model's basic form, people maximize a "utility function" at every point in time. 142 A utility function is a way to quantify happiness or well-being, which is called "utility" in economics. The basic idea is that people (e.g., consumers making financial decisions) pick the option that will make them the best off from the available options. Of course these decisions are often made in the face of uncertainty: I will take the surface roads because I expect there to be heavy traffic. This maximizes one's utility ex ante. It may have been the case that taking the highway would have been better, but given the information on hand at that time (Google Maps said there was a red line on the highway), the driver made the rational choice.
Decision makers in this rational decision-making framework can be characterized as possessing the following qualities:
14 1 (1) they have access to all of the existing, relevant information to inform their choices, (2) they use that information appropriately and in accordance to the laws of probability, (3) they respond to prices, and (4) they have "fixed, welldefined preferences. 1 44 These "preferences" are what make up a utility function and are assumed to be purely selfish and self-serving (no caring for other people, altruism, reciprocity, etc.).
14 5 This model has come to proliferate in law and economics and in legal analysis as well. In the context of title lending, a rational borrower considering using a title loan would (1) gather a sufficient amount of information about the loan and its prices, (2) accurately understand the terms of the loan (APR, fees, repossession policies, etc.), (3) gather information about alternative sources of credit, and (4) use the laws of probability to calculate the chances by which he would be able and unable to repay his loan. These probabilities would be based on a number of uncertain factors: income, regular expenses (rent for example), and unexpected expenses (doctor visits, etc.). The rational model even predicts that consumers would have rational expectations about these uncertain expenses; borrowers do not need to predict the future perfectly, but they need to (under the rational model) have an accurate understanding of the underlying distribution of changes to spending they could face. That is, they know the likelihood of experiencing a good or bad "shock," and they plan their behavior, saving and spending according to those likelihoods. Further, under the rational model, consumers would have rational expectations about the probability of having their car repossessed. With that probability in mind, they would weigh the options of taking the loan or not taking the loan.
Despite its prominence, there is overwhelming evidence from both psychology and economics against many of the assumptions that go into the rational actor model. 1 47 Enter behavioral economics. This field maintains most of the primary elements of the rational actor model of decision making, but alters it to incorporate psychological evidence concerning how humans actually behave in real life. For example, we know that the way decisions are presented or "framed" to consumers can dramatically affect choices.
1 4 8 Furthermore, people seem to evaluate potential losses in utility in a way that is inconsistent with the traditional rational model. 1 and people misunderstand and miscalculate when thinking about probabilities and other complicated math problems required by utility maximization.
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Given the mountain of evidence that people are not purely rational, especially when it comes to borrowing and saving behavior, we argue that borrowers in the title lending market are unlikely to follow the rational model of behavior. Below we summarize the relevant literature and then explain which anomalies are most relevant in this market and how they play out. We argue that borrowers are, for the most part, weighing perceived costs and benefits rationally. They may be, however, mispredicting their ability to repay the loan. People seem to think they will be able to repay (i.e., save in between when loan payments are do) more aggressively than they do. This misprediction may be due to misperceiving costs incurred in the intervening periods between loan payments, or it may be due to overoptimism about one's own future behavior.
Sections A, B, and C outline these psychological factors as they relate to title lending. In each case, we demonstrate how title lending customers likely underestimate the true cost of title loans.
A. Optimism and Overconfidence
Overoptimism 1 5 4 and the closely-related overconfidence 55 are welldocumented behavioral anomalies.
56 Nobel prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman notes, "people tend to be overly optimistic about their relative standing on any activity in which they do moderately well."
5 A classic example of this is that the vast majority of drivers (ninety-three percent) think they are better at driving than the median driver.
58 Of course, since "median" means the point at which half of people are above and half are below, it is not mathematically possible that ninety- No. 4] three percent of people are better drivers than the median driver. Even accounting for differences in the varying definitions of a "good driving," most respondents are overconfident. Overconfidence takes many forms and people do not seem to easily learn about or adjust their overconfidence. 159 In the context of title lending, we might guess that borrowers are overly optimistic that they will pay their loan on time. Anecdotal evidence suggests that consumers similar to those in this market are often late paying off the loan and take longer to repay than they think they will. 60 Our results show that customers taking out a loan on the day of the survey do in fact show signs of overoptimism, however it is not severe. Table 9 shows the answers to the question "How many months total do you think it will take to completely pay off this loan (after all renewals/rollovers?)" for customers who were taking out a loan on the day of the survey. The table also includes the information from a required Texas disclosure that shows how long borrowers usually take to pay off their title loan.
1 61 The percentage of people in our sample who thought they would pay the loan off in two to three months is higher than the general usage data would imply, and the percentage of people in our sample who thought it would take six or more months to pay off the loan is too low compared to the general usage data. This leads us to believe that people may be overly optimistic about their ability to repay. This could be because of so-called "consumption shocks" that occur over the borrowing period: a child gets sick, the utility bill is larger than expected, etc., or it could be because people have less money in their bank account at the end of the 30 days than they thought they would-not because of unexpected bills but because of unpredicted impatience with savings and spending, a possibility we discuss next. But overall, the results are not severe. People are relatively good at predicting their ability to repay, although there is room for improvement. The disclosure form requires a company to provide information on the cost of the loan. It also includes information on how long borrowers typically take to pay off a title loan. The data for the disclosure are taken from a 2010 Tennessee report on title pledge lending. We refer to the information on months it actually takes people to pay off the loan as general usage data. We would also expect that customers familiar with the title loan product and their own behavior might learn about themselves and become less overoptimistic over time. The rational model predicts that title loan customers will learn from their own use of a product with a latent risk. 162 A latent risk is one that is unknown before using the product, but becomes known through the use of the product or service. 163 The more frequently a title lending customer uses title loans and experiences the unforeseen risk of multiple rollovers, the more likely the customer is to begin to foresee that risk and correct overoptimism about repayment. Our results show that this type of learning may occur in the title loan market. Using the same question, "How many months total do you think it will take to completely pay off this loan (after all renewals/rollovers?)," we compare in Table 10 the answers for people taking out a loan for the first time with the answers for people who had used a title loan before. 165 Fewer people who have used a title loan before think that they will pay off the loan in one month than people taking out a loan for the first time do. Similarly, more people who have used title loans in the past think it will take them six or more months to pay off the loan than those who have never used one before. Thus, it appears that customers do learn about the latent risk of the product or their own behavioral tendencies through using the service. 162 . See Bar-Gill, supra note 13, at 755. 163. Seeid. at 755 56. 164. Id. ("Starting with intrapersonal learning, the speed with which a consumer will learn about a latent risk associated with a product will depend on how frequently she uses the product and how frequently the risk materializes."). Even if people learn about their own behavior and how loans work through repeated interactions with a title lender, their behavior may not change over time. People may be persistently "naive" about their future behavior. We turn to this possibility next.
B. Choice Over Time
First, we must describe the canonical model that economists use to study tradeoffs over time. Note that nearly every choice has an "intertemporal element," that is some costs and benefits that come at different points in time. For example, choosing to update your iPad software gives you future benefits of more user-friendly environment, but at the cost of spending some time to learn those updates before the benefits are reaped.
Recall that we consider consumers to have a utility function that represents happiness or well-being. People make choices so as to maximize that happiness, working with the set of available choices. 166 People pick and choose, or "trade off," goods subject to having to stay within their "budget constraint" (loosely, their income and savings). For example, I can afford 1 banana and 2 apples or 0 bananas and 3 apples. I quite like apples, so I will go with the latter.
Just like that simple tradeoff, people trade off "utilities" and "disutilities" (which can be roughly described as bursts or doses of happiness or unhappiness) over time. People might take a hit to utility (increasing disutility) today for a future benefit: completing a homework assignment today creates disutility now but enables the future utility of being able to attend the Barristers' Ball on Friday night. The costs and benefits involved in a tradeoff can also be reversed. Staying out late with friends on a Wednesday night could come with the extra disutility of having to cram all of one's studying into an all-nighter before an exam rather than studying for shorter periods of time spread over the week. These same tradeoffs affect choices in lending markets: Borrowing $500 today means big benefits today (increased cash flow) but costs in the future (monthly interest payments).
See supra note 142.
The rational actor model has precise predictions about how these tradeoffs over time are weighed. The model says that people weigh how much (or little) they care about the future, and predict their future choices in accordance with those weights. If one is a very "patient" person, she might plan do all her homework on Monday, well before it is due. If someone was relatively "impatient," she might choose to delay a costly task like homework for some future date. Important to this rational actor model is that people (whether they be patient or impatient) accurately predict their future behavior (outside of some major changes like a blizzard occuring and plans were changed).
Many parts of this model are intuitive: people do seem to tradeoff costs and benefits over time, and people are more patient when considering the distant future. The model even allows for there to be differences across people in their level of patience. This model, however, called "exponential discounting" is very rigid and can be unrealistic.
Beyond the rigidity of assuming people have precisely the same level of patience all the time (note this rules out behavior such as "most of the time I do my homework but once in a while I throw caution to the wind and stay out all night"), it is unrealistic in that people often mispredict their level of patience "I might be impatient today but tomorrow I will go on a diet." Note that mispredictions about levels of patience are considered to be self-control problems by behavioral economists, and the mispredictions almost universally go in one way: people think they will have more self-control than they actually do: "I want to start saving for retirement, but I will work that out next week." "This is my last cigarette." "I want to lose weight, so I really really will start exercising hard, tomorrow." And so on.
Essentially, all of us procrastinate and have self-control problems from time to time. But this common sense, all-too-common behavior is completely at odds with the rational actor model. In fact, the weight of experimental evidence, and evidence from the real work, and mere common sense suggest people are "present-biased:" They are impatient in the short-run, patient when making choices over the longer run, and further, they mispredict these preferences. Behavioral economists recognize this reality and have begun to document the important of such behavior in consumer markets.
Models of "present-biasedness" have been used to understand behavior in many areas, including credit markets. Evidence of presentbiasedness has been shown in the context of smoking, 167 weight loss, saving, 16 8 credit cards, payday loans, and pawnshops. Consequently, thinking about present-biasedness in the world of title lending is obvious. Borrowing today means receiving benefits (getting the principal amount of the loan) now, with costs (having to pay back principal plus interest payments -potentially very large interest payments) to be incurred in the future."' We note that borrowing at high interest need not necessarily be "irrational." People could be reasonably calculating the tradeoffs and making choices accordingly. Those tradeoffs would almost surely be considered "impatient" if we were to calibrate the tradeoffs empirically. But again, impatience is not irrational. The misprediction of one's level of patience is. If I need emergency medical treatment now, the utility I get from obtaining money now by borrowing could be so large that it is rational for me to borrow at 300% APR to cover the medical expenses.
We posit that just like almost any other market that has been studied involving consumer choice, borrowers in the title lending market think they will be patient, saving for the future, and that they will easily pay off the lender in a timely manner. But under a model of misprediction of future patience, a borrower, for example, will in the end fail to be as patient as he expected, and will have a harder time repaying than expected at the time he took out the loan.
To learn about the levels of patience (or impatience as it were) of our consumers, we asked them two questions related to their tradeoffs over time (also called "time preferences"). The first question asked them to hypothetically choose between receiving $60 today or receiving $75 in one month as a lottery prize. The second asked them to make a similar comparison looking six months into the future: choose between receiving $100 in six months or $125 in seven months. By combining these two answers, we can determine the basic time preference category of the borrower. For example, a person who chose to delay payment for more money in both scenarios would be considered patient, but a person who chose less money sooner in both scenarios would be deemed impatient. A person who makes the inconsistent choice of impatience in the first scenario but patience in the second scenario is present-biased because "the implied discount rate in the near-term frame is higher than that of the distant frame." 1 Table 11 presents the results of the time preferences of borrowers.
169. To take a simple example, many students borrow to finance their college education in order to obtain the benefits of a degree early in life, before they have had a chance to save up enough money for tuition. They plan to deal with the costs later in life, when they are better situated to pay off the debt. Borrowing money allows them to "smooth" their consumption over their life course. We find that 19% of our borrowers were present-biased. Recall that this means they think they will be more patient tomorrow than they are today and will mispredict their willingness to save over the course of the month to pay off the loan. 30% of borrowers were impatient, meaning that they highly discount the future but are consistent in their choices. 37% were actually patient, meaning they were not irrational in their predictions about future discounting, and they were not impatient.
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We think there is more to the story; while a hyperbolic model is a nice way to more realistically capture certain aspects of decision making, it can also be quite rigid in itself. It assumes, for example, that people have the same level of self-control problems in every time period, ruling out the possibility that someone might be mostly patient but once in a while throw caution to the wind and, for example, stay out all night partying.
1 3 It also assumes that people understand the inherent risks in a product or service, but that they misunderstand their own preferences. Next, we discuss more basic mistakes in decision making, and specifically, rely on limited attention, a very basic, common sense approach to decision theory, but one that has been relatively new on the scene to empirical behavioral economists.
C. Limited Attention
Several recent papers have used the fact that people have limited attention to explain behavior. tics" 1 "6 to ease the decision-making process. Using heuristics in a context like subprime lending may narrow one's attention to the attractiveseeming aspects of the loan that the lender wants to highlight, at the cost of concealing important facts that may turn out to be detrimental.
Behavioral economists have theoretical models for how people use their attention. For example, in Gabaix and Laibson's work, 1 " they show that many goods are marketed intentionally with "salient" and "shrouded" attributes, for example, a printer that is inexpensive but uses extremely costly ink."8 Consumers do not, or do not fully, consider the cost of replacing the ink when purchasing the printer. Another nice example of work that studies limited attention in a large consumer market (note that much of the research is from lab experiments) is Lacertal, Pope, and Sydnor 1 9 They use 22 million used car sale transactions to document the existence of a "left-digit bias"; that is, when shopping for cars, both consumers and dealers assign disproportionate weight to the left-most digits in the mileage figure (making 49,900 and 50,000 miles appear to be vastly different mileage figures, for example). 8 0 This is borne out in the patterns of used car auction purchase prices.
In the world of title lending, we think that a few aspects of the transaction are particularly salient, and some are more shrouded. For instance, title lending advertising emphasizes the speed at which the customer can obtain the cash, 81 the maximum loan amount the lender will give, 18 2 the ability of the customer to keep their cars,"' and the conven-ience of doing business with the company. 1 8 4 Title lending advertisements do not generally mention the interest rate of the loans, the likelihood a loan will result in a vehicle being repossessed, or the likely amount of time it will take for the borrower to repay the debt. 8 State and federal disclosure laws require that the loan contracts disclose the finance charge and interest rate, but they do not, for the most part, require that lenders disclose any pattern of usage information to inform borrowers about the likely consequences of having taken out a loan. 186 More importantly, laws do not generally require price disclosures be made upfront-that is before the borrower has invested substantial effort into obtaining the loan. For instance, Texas' law requires that lenders provide disclosures at the time the loan is made, 187 but the statute does not require the disclosures any earlier in the process than when the borrower is signing the final paperwork. Even though loan documents may have pertinent pricing information and may be short, 188 the disclosure of price is shrouded by the timing in which the borrower receives it.
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In sum, a mountain of common sense as well as empirical work documents attention as a scare resource. Lenders are acutely aware of this phenomenon and without regulatory prodding, will emphasize favorable transaction terms and shroud unfavorable ones. 190 By shrouding price terms and the likely ways the borrower will use the loan, lenders are able to encourage borrowers to underestimate the cost of the title loan.
Each of these behavioral deviations from the rational choice model suggests that borrowers in title lending markets are underestimating the true costs of the loans. Some borrowers are overly optimistic about the speed at which they will repay the debt, some experience self-control problems that cause them to mispredict their future patience, and others exhibit limited attention and focus on non-price terms of the transaction.
While none of these suboptimal decisions portray title loans as scandalous, they do indicate a need for laws to correct irrational behavior in this market.
note 181 ("The best part about getting a car title loan with TitleMax is that you get to keep driving your car."). 
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
We have presented survey evidence that reveals demographic information about title lending customers and demonstrates how title lending customers deviate from the theoretical portrait of the rational actor in systematic, predictable ways. But the question remains: what should regulators do about this lending product? Our conclusion is to suggest one type of regulation, product-use disclosures, and to discourage another, prohibition.
We argue that the primary response to the problem of underestimating the true cost of title loans is behaviorally-informed disclosures. 191 Policymakers should require that title lending companies post information about how people actually use title loans: information about the number of times people rollover their loan, the amount of money these rollovers cost in total, the number and amount of late fees and other fees people pay, and the likelihood of defaulting on the loan. Oren Bar-Gill's recent book, Seduction by Contract, distinguishes between productattribute disclosures and product-use disclosures. 192 Product-attribute disclosures provide information about the product itself, such as a loan's interest rate or the fee for paying late.
1 9 3 Product-use disclosures, on the other hand, inform customers about their own probable future use patterns, such as common "[b]orrowing patterns and the incidence of late payment."
1 94 This latter type of disclosure is so important because if title lending borrowers are likely to make the types of mistakes we identify in Part V, information about the title loan product's attributes will be insufficient to ensure the market functions. For instance, if borrowers only know the loan's APR but are overly optimistic about how long it will take them to pay off the loan, they will underestimate the cost of the loan. Similarly, if they are present-biased and mispredict their abilities to be patient and save to pay off the loan, they will make mistakes about how long it will take to repay the debt (and ultimately the loan's cost). Borrowers need to know the likely way they will use the product to weight its utility.
Lenders can base product-use disclosures on either average-use patterns that focus on how a large group uses a product or individual-use patterns that focus on how a specific individual has used a product in the past. 95 While individual-use disclosures are more effective in communicating relevant, believable information to borrowers, they are infeasible in title lending markets because many borrowers do not have long-term relationships with single title lenders. 196 Thus, the best option for title lending disclosures is to see how borrowers generally use the product.
Some work disputes the efficacy of disclosure-based regulations, arguing that disclosure has failed as a regulatory strategy to improve markets."T Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider, for instance, point to "empirical evidence [to] show that mandated disclosure regularly fails in practice . 1..."98 While we have to leave the general concerns about disclosures to others, there is empirical evidence in fringe consumer credit markets that product-use disclosures do affect consumer decision making. Marianne Bertrand and Adair Morse offered payday lending customers four different types of information treatments as the customers took out payday loans and then measured the effect of the information on consumer behaviors, operating on the assumption that "if all or a subset of payday borrowers are cognitively impaired, one might expect borrowing behavior to respond to how the costs (and benefits) of the payday products are being disclosed." ' 99 One information treatment presented a graphic depicting how long it takes the average person to pay off a payday loan. 200 Bertrand and Morse explain that "this treatment gets borrowers to take a broader look at the payday borrowing decision, and may therefore also partly undo borrowers' tendency to apply too narrow a decision frame. To assess the effect of the information treatments, they tracked the behavior of customers subjected to the different treatments and compared each group to a control group and to each other. Based on this comparison, they conclude that information that makes people think less narrowly (over time) about finance costs results in less borrowing. In particular, reinforcing the adding-up dollar fees incurred when rolling over loans reduces the take-up of future payday loans by 11% in the subsequent 4 months.
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Following Bertrand and Morse's graphic depiction of patterns of use, Texas now requires a disclosure statement to be given to any customer taking out a title loan that includes information on fees and actual usage patterns of the loan. 2 3 The disclosure includes information on the proportion of people who roll over their loans for two to three months, four to five months, and six or more months, and the proportion of people who do not roll over their loans. 204 To look at whether this disclosure is effective in changing people's beliefs about how they will use the loan, we must compare the expected number of months to repayment for Texas borrowers and for borrowers in our other states. Unfortunately, once we restrict our sample to borrowers taking out the loan on the day of the survey, we are left with only thirty borrowers from Texas. Our results, therefore, cannot provide much reliable information on the effectiveness of the disclosure, and we leave this question for further research. Nevertheless, Bertrand and Morse's work reveals the efficacy of productuse disclosures in this particular market.
While Texas' disclosure provides some of the information needed to remove bias from faulty decision-making, the disclosure would be much more effective if it were posted prominently in the store so that customers could see the information before incurring the transaction costs involved in applying for the loan. 2 5 Requiring title lending companies to present pattern of use information in their advertising on the Internet and in stores would maximize the effect the information could have on borrowers and limit companies' abilities to capitalize on borrowers' limited attention.
Although we believe policymakers should intervene in the title lending market in new ways, by requiring creative and prominent product-use disclosures, the evidence we obtained through our survey does not indicate that states (or the federal government) should prohibit title lending. The primary argument advanced by policymakers for banning title lending has been that a substantial portion of customers are risking their livelihood by taking out a loan secured by their vehicle. 2 0 6 Proponents of this view have admitted that they were uncertain of the evidence for this claim, 20 but our survey, along with state regulatory reports, strongly suggest that this concern has been vastly overstated.
2 8 State regulatory reports reveal that only a small minority of borrowers lose their car to repossession, and the responses to our survey indicate that only a small minority of those customers that lose a car would be unable to get to work.
Moreover, some evidence exists that many people are using title loans in the way the rational actor model would predict, suggesting a functioning market that could result in welfare maximization.
2 9 People make decent predictions about the total length of time they will pay interest on their loan, so many borrowers are not overly optimistic, 210 and our survey indicates that borrowers exhibit intrapersonal learning as they use the product over time, ameliorating some of the irrational decision making. 211 Finally, the demographic information our survey uncovered does not compel radical market intervention. Title lending customers are not, when compared to the general population, disproportionately members of racial minority groups, are not exceedingly young or exceedingly old, and do not lack education. Certainly, some demographic characteristics do make title lending customers more vulnerable to unscrupulous practices, such as the fact that many are unbanked and many are selfemployed, which may indicate a lack of access to other sources of credit that require income. Yet, overall, the picture of title lending customers is closer to the mainstream of society than prior research argues. Given these demographic characteristics, the evidence of rational decision making, and the vacuity of the argument that a large portion of people will lose their only way to work, the case for prohibiting title loans is unconvincing.
What is clear is that we are at an opportune moment for legal reform. In many ways, the title lending market is unlike its fellow fringe banking counterparts. Payday loans are essentially uniform across the country with a set fee for an approximately two week loan.
2 1 2 Legislatures have taken definitive and concrete action to address the loan product.
